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FEDERAL TAXATION

'STOCK DISTRIBUTIONS IN DISCHARGE OF SERVICE
OBLIGATONS: FENDER SALES LIMITS TAXPAYER'S JOY
If ever a contented man who had taxes to pay existed, it most assuredly
was one who successfully contrived a means to convert ordinary income into
capital gains. A limited opportunity for the accomplishment of this desired
result was presented by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in Joy
Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner., Joy Manufacturing Company and its
English subsidiary, Joy Sullivan, Ltd., were engaged in the manufacture and
sale of mining and construction equipment. It was the practice of the parent
corporation to render services to Joy Sullivan in return for a specified engineering and service fee that was customarily allowed to accrue on the books2
of the subsidiary and was presumably discharged at the end of the year.
The necessity arose of providing Joy Sullivan with additional working capital,
and an English lending institution was consulted to obtain a loan. The
English lender consented to furnish the needed funds only on the stipulation
that the parent corporation receive stock in lieu of money as compensation
for services to be rendered during the term of the loan. The taxpayer continued to render services to its English subsidiary and, pursuant to the
agreement, accepted stock of Joy Sullivan, Ltd. with a fair market value equal
to the accrued liability for services rendered. Joy Sullivan deducted this
amount as a current operating expense on its British income tax return.
However, Joy Manufacturing Company did not report the fair market value
of the stock received as income, and the Commissioner asserted a deficiency
against the taxpayer as to the tax on this amount. The court of appeals,
reversing the Tax Court, 3 held that Joy Manufacturing Company had -not
realized income from the receipt of stock for the services rendered. The
court noted that the parent corporation owned one hundred per cent of the
stock of Joy Sullivan, Ltd. both before and after the distribution and, therefore, it had received nothing more than it had previously possessed in return
for its services to the subsidiary. While the net value of the investment in
Joy Sullivan was increased by the discharge of the liability for the services
rendered, the court relied on -the broad holding of Eisner v. Macomber'
that a prorata distribution of stock to the shareholders of a corporation is
not gross income to those shareholders. Under the assumption that an
increase in the net value of Joy's investment in its subsidiary will be reflected
in the fair market value of its Joy Sullivan stock, the court's decision had
the effect of allowing Joy Manufacturing Company to postpone recognition
1. 230 F.2d 740 (3d Cir. 1956).
2. Although Joy Manufacturing Co. utilized an accrual basis of accounting, it did not
-recognize income when it rendered services to the subsidiary corporation because of its
prior agreement to accept stock in lieu of money as compensation. The court determined
that the distribution of stock by the subsidiary did not amount to a realization of income
and, therefore, no income accrued to Joy. This issue was the basis of the Tax Court's
decision in favor of the Commissioner but the decision was reversed on other grounds by
the court of appeals.
3. 23 T.C. 1082 (1955).
4. 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
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of its gain until it disposed of the Joy Sullivan stock - a result that effectively
transformed ordinary income into capital gains.5 Earlier 1939 Code cases
involving issues similar to those in Joy were in accord,6 and the Service
7
acquiesced in the rationale of these cases.
The ecstasy of the taxpayer who found himself in the position to take
advantage of the Joy holding was soon dampened by a directly contrary
decision rendered by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Commissioner v. Fender Sales, Inc.s In Fender Sales, two taxpayers each owned fifty
per cent of the stock of Fender Sales, Inc. and, in addition, were salaried
employees of that corporation. Fender Sales, Inc., while solvent throughout
the years in question, was continuously plagued by a shortage of working
capital and thus was in a plight similar to that which Joy Sullivan, Ltd. had
encountered. To aid the cash position of Fender Sales, both taxpayers did
not withdraw any salaries due from the corporation but instead allowed a
salary liability to accrue on the books of the corporation. 9 This step proved
inadequate to remedy the cash shortage and the corporation was forced to
seek bank financing. Sufficient financing was obtained, but the bank, fearing
the possible priority of the salary liabilities, required as a condition to its
loan that the accrued salary obligations be capitalized. This capitalization was
accomplished by the issuance of stock with a value equal to the accrued
salaries payable in discharge of that liability account. The taxpayers did not
not report the fair market value of the stock as income on their returns for
the year, but Fender Sales deducted this amount as a current expense in
computing its taxable income. This procedure was followed for several ensuing years with the taxpayers reporting no income from the receipt of the
stock in any year. The Commissioner asserted a deficiency to the extent
of the tax on the fair market value of the stock received, but the Tax Court,
following the Joy rationale, held that no income had been realized.1 ° The
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, employing two separate lines of
reasoning, reversed the Tax Court. The court first stated that although the
issuance of the stock was prorata and the taxpayers held all of the stock of
Fender Sales, both before and after the distribution, the value of their

5.

This is based on the theoretical supposition that the increase in net worth will be

reflected in the market value of the Joy Sullivan stock. This may or may not be the case,
and it is conceivable that the market value would not reflect much, if any, of this gain
that would allow Joy Manufacturing Co. to escape taxation entirely.
6. See Daggitt v. Commissioner, 23 T.C. 31 (1954); Josephson v. Commissioner, 6 CCH
Tax Ct. Mem. 788 (1947).
7. 1955-1 Cust. BULL. 4, acquiescing in Daggitt v. Commissioner, 23 T.C. 31 (1954).
8. 338 F.2d 924 (9th Cir. 1964).

9. Although the corporation, which was on the accrual basis of accounting, had the
benefit of a tax deduction for the amount of the salary expense, the taxpayers did not have
to report this as taxable income since they were on a cash basis of accounting. INT. REV.
CODE of 1954, §267 (a)(2)(A), which disallows a deduction to the corporation where an
expense is not actually paid within two and one-half months after the close of the taxable
year, does not apply in this instance because the relationship test of section 267 (b) is not
met.
10. 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 550 (1963).
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investment in the corporation was enhanced by the amount of the salary
liability discharged. The court determined that the stock distribution coupled
with this increment in value was income subject to taxation under the
sixteenth amendment to the Constitution and was not a stock dividend
under Eisner v. Macomber.- Second, the court stated that one of the components of the transactions between Fender Sales, Inc. and the taxpayers was
the cancellation of an indebtedness that, if collected, would have resulted
in the realization of income to the taxpayers. The court characterized this
as an assignment of previously earned income that, under the authority of
Helvering v. Horst, 2 was taxable to the two shareholders to the extent of the
fair market value of the shares received in discharge of this indebtedness.
After the decision in Fender Sales the Service withdrew its earlier acquiescence in the Joy cases and ruled that it would follow the holding in Fender
Sales.1 3 The new ruling stated that a prorata stock distribution issued to
shareholder-employees in discharge of salary obligations owed to them represents an enhancement in the value of their corporate investment and, as such,
is a realization of income to the recipients.
THE Eisner v. Macomber ARxA

The genesis of the Internal Revenue Code with respect to whether an
item is taxable income is section 61, which provides that "gross income
means all income from whatever source derived."'- Consequently, an examination of the taxation of prorata stock distributions in discharge of obligations for services rendered must begin with the presumption that stock distributions are income unless otherwise excluded. Section 305 of the Code,
which purports to deal with distributions of stock and stock rights, contains
the following statement: "[G]ross income does not include the amount, of
any distribution made by a corporation to its shareholders, with respect to
the stock of such corporation, in its stock."'15 The italicized portion of the
statute indicates that a stock distribution must be to the shareholders in their
capacity as shareholders and not to creditors, employees, or others to escape
taxation under section 305. In both Joy and Fender Sales the shareholders
received stock in their capacity as employees and not as shareholders, and
section 305 would therefore be inapplicable in both situations. Congressional
intent to tax such distributions might be implied from a cross reference in
section 305 (c) (3) to section 61. The clear implication of this cross reference
is that in the case of a distribution that has the effect of the payment of
compensation, the distribution would be gross income. However, section
7806 (a) indicates such cross references are for convenience only and do
not have the effect of law. The Treasury regulations categorically interpret
11. 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
12. 311 U.S. 112 (1940).
13. Rev. Rul. 67-402, 1967-2 CuN. BuLL. 135.
14. INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, §61 (a) (emphasis added).

15. INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, §805 (a) (emphasis added). Section 305 (b) provides for two
exceptions to the rule of §305 (a), but nithbr is relevant here.
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section 61 as encompassing transfers by a corporation of its own stock to
employees for services rendered and would tax the employee to the extent
of the fair market value of the stock receivd.16
The taxpayers in both Joy and Fender Sales sought to escape the tentacles
of section 61 under the broad rationale of one of the most celebrated cases
in the annals of tax history - Eisner v. Macomber.17 In Eisner the Supreme
Court held that a stock dividend made against the accumulated earnings of
a corporation is not taxable income under the sixteenth amendment of the
Constitution. It would appear that if Eisner v. Macomber were confined to
this narrow holding, section 305 would be the statutory enactment of the
Court's decision and the taxpayers in both Joy and Fender Sales would be
taxed to the extent of the stock received. This was, in effect, the position
of the circuit court in Fender Sales, which stated that Eisner was "not even
apposite, let alone controlling." ' The court reasoned that a stock dividend,
as dealt with in Eisner, represented nothing of value when issued proportionately to all shareholders and was not a realization of income. But the
court went on to say that this was because the basic net worth of the
corporation remained the same. This was distinguished from the situation
in Fender Sales by pointing out that, although the shareholders' proportionate
interests in the corporation remained unchanged after the stock distribution,
the corporate net worth had increased as a result of the discharge of the
salary obligations. The court concluded that the value of the shareholders'
investments was, therefore, increased by the issuance of the stock and this
was a realization of income.
Although the court of appeals in Fender Sales confines Eisner v. Macomber's application to stock dividends accompanied solely by a capitalization
of retained earnings, the ramifications of Eisner v. Macomber are much
broader in scope. The Court in Eisner defined income as19
[N]ot a growth or increment of value in the investment; but a gain,
a profit, something of exchangeable value proceeding from the property, from the capital however invested or employed, and coming in,
being "derived," that is received or drawn by the recipient (the
taxpayer) for his separate use, benefit and disposal; - that is income
derived from property.
The position of the court in Fender Sales that the net worth of the taxpayers'
holdings in the corporation had increased as a result of the discharge of the
debt is not disputed, but is this equivalent to a realization of income? The
quoted portion of the opinion in Eisner v. Macomber states that income is
not merely an increment in value but rather is something separate from the
capital and that proceeds from capital. In the facts at hand, the taxpayers
held the same one hundred per cent interests in their respective corporations
both before and after the stock distributions. These interests had appreciated
16.

Treas. Reg. §1.61- (2) (d) (4) (1966).

17. 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
18. 338 F.2d 924, 927 (9th Cir. 1964).
19. 252 U.S. 189, 207 (1920).
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in value because of the discharge of the debt liabilities and the concomitant
increase in net worth of the corporation. In applying the Eisner v. Macomber
income concept to these facts, no realization of income has occurred. The
result is only an unrealized gain in the form of an appreciated interest in the
corporation. It is admitted by the court in Fender Sales that the stock issued
by the corporation and distributed to the shareholders was nothing more
than an indicator of a capital investment in the corporation.20 Consequently,
the proportionate distribution of stock to shareholders who already owned
all of the stock of the corporation cannot in and of itself be deemed "something of value" as required by the Eisnerv. Macoamber criterion. If it is therefore to be asserted that the taxpayers in Joy and Fender.Sales have realized
income solely on the grounds that they have received stock that represents
an increase in the net worth of their corporate investments, as the Internal
Revenue Service ostensibly does in Revenue Ruling 67-402, 2 1 then such an
assertion is not in keeping with the concept of income as expressed in Eisner
v. Macomber and should not be upheld.
ASSIGNMENT

OF INCOME AND OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

The opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Fender
Sales contains a discussion of the assignment of income aspect of the discharge
of the service liabilities, but the discussion is inserted in such a manner that
there exists the inescapable conclusion that the court considered it only as
a secondary feature of its argument. NeverthelesS, this aspect of the court's
opinion becomes the focal point of examination in regard to both Fender
Sales and Joy.
The basic thrust of the assignment of income concept is that income
should be taxed to those who earn or otherwise create the right to receive
it. 2 2 This concept had its beginnings in the case of Lucas v. Earl23 in which
an agreement between a husband and wife that the husband's salary would
be divided equally between them was held invalid for tax purposes, and the
entire amount was deemed taxable. to the husband. This case was followed
ten years later by the decision of the Supreme Court in Helvering v. Horst,24
in which a father was held liable for the tax on income received by his son
on the redemption of coupons the father had detached from his negotiable
bonds and given to the son. The Court in Horst made clear that actual
receipt of money or property is not a necessary prerequisite to the realization
of income but realization can occur when "the last step is taken by which
[the taxpayer] obtains the fruition of the economic gain which has already
accrued to him." 25 The Court also adds that "[t]he power to dispose of

20.
21.
22.
25.
24.
25.

358 F.2d 924, 927 (9th Cir. 1964).
Rev. Rul. 67-402, 1967-2 Cum. BuLL. 155.
Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 119 (1940).
281 U.S. 111 (1950).
311 U.S. 112 (1940).
Id. at 115.
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income is the equivalent of ownership of it."26 In Helvering v. Eubank,"
the Supreme Court reaffirmed the Horst decision and held that an assignment
of insurance renewal commissions to another would not allow the assignee to
escape income tax liability since the taxpayer had created the right to receive
these payments by services previously rendered.
Examining the facts of Fender Sales in light of the assignment of income
decisions, it is evident that the taxpayers had performed services for the
corporation and had thereby created a right to compensation. This right to
compensation was unquestionably unexercised prior to the stock distributions,
and no amount was includable in the income of the taxpayers during that
period since they were on a cash basis of accounting and no payments had
been received. 28 The transaction in which stock was issued to the taxpayers by
the corporation to discharge the debt effected a contribution to the capital of
the corporation consisting of the amount due them for the services previously
rendered. The contribution to the capital of Fender Sales, Inc. amounted to
a diversion of previously earned income from the taxpayers to the corporation
- an occurrence that was nothing more than an assignment of a naked right
to income. Such a transfer is clearly within the principles enunciated by the
Supreme Court in Eubank and Horst and would result in a tax liability to
the taxpayers on the amount of income assigned to the corporation. Judge
Barnes, in a separate opinion in Fender Sales, argued that no assignment of
income was present on the grounds that there existed no diversion of income
for the benefit of the taxpayers in a manner that was equivalent to ownership. 29 This loses sight of the fact that the taxpayers, who already possessed
a fixed right to receive compensation for services previously rendered,
voluntarily relinquished their claims in exchange for a stock that was of no
value to the taxpayers. 30 The intended effect of this relinquishment was to
divert the amount of this compensation to their corporation to enable it to
obtain credit, thereby benefiting themselves. Such a voluntary diversion was
equivalent to ownership of the compensation and certainly benefited the taxpayers. Professors Lyon and Eustice, in an excellent article on the assignment
of income, 31 support this conclusion by stating that "compensation for personal services performed by the tax payer is an inherently non-assignable gross
income item." 32 The diversion of previously earned compensation to Fender
Sales, Inc. by the taxpayers, despite the fact that it was carried out under
the guise of a stock dividend, was nevertheless an assignment of a right to
income and should be taxed to the shareholders of Fender Sales, Inc. on that
basis.
The application of the assignment of income principles to the Joy facts
26. Id. at 118.
27. 311 U.S. 122 (1940).
28. Section 267 (b) is not applicable. See note 9 supra.
29. 338 F.2d 924, 930, 931 (9th Cir. 1964) (dissenting in part and concurring in part).

30. See text accompanying notes 14-21.
31. Lyon & Eustice, Assignment of Income: Fruit and Tree as Irrigated by the P. G.
Lake Case, 17 TAx L. REv. 293 (1962).
32. Id. at 388, 389.
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takes a different twist from the almost conventional application in Fender
Sales.33 The distinction lies in the manner in which the rights to payments
were transferred in Joy. It will be remembered that the taxpayers in Fender
Sales "assigned" their income to the corporation after the actual rendering of
the services. In Joy, however, an agreement to accept stock rather than money
for services rendered to the subsidiary corporation was made before the
performance. Ordinarily, it is immaterial whether the assignment of compensation occurs before or after the services are performed and the income
4
would be taxed to the person who earned it.3
However, a decision by the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Commissioner v. Giannini35 places
Joy in a different light. In Giannini, the taxpayer, who served as president
of a small corporation, informed his corporation that he would accept no
compensation for the services to be performed in a future period and suggested
that it do something worthwhile with the money. The corporation contributed the sum to a charity and the taxpayer included no part of this in
his income for that year. The court rejected the Commissioner's argument
that this was an assignment of income, distinguishing Horst and other cases
on the grounds that the taxpayer did not receive money or other property
and did not direct its disposition. The court said that Giannini simply refused
in advance to accept future compensation and "so far as the taxpayer was
concerned, the corporation could have kept the money." 36 The holding in
Giannini that a refusal to accept compensation prior to the rendering of
services is outside the assignment of income area is further substantiated in a
revenue ruling pertaining to fiduciaries of estates. 37 Here, the Service ruled
that a timely waiver of a fiduciary's right to compensation for future services
to an estate would not subject the fiduciary to any tax on the value of his
services since, it was said, he would be rendering them gratuitously. It is in
light of Giannini and this ruling that the timing of the agreement in Joy
becomes important. The agreement between Joy Manufacturing Company
and Joy Sullivan, Ltd., which preceded the actual rendition of services by
the parent corporation, was to accept stock in lieu of money as compensation.
It has previously been determined that the receipt of stock by a party who
already owns all of the stock of the corporation has no tax significance under
Eisner v. Macomber.38 The receipt of stock in such an instance is nothing of
value to the shareholders. Since Joy Manufacturing Company effectively
relinquished all right to any real compensation for the services it was to render
to its subsidiary in the future, it must be deemed to have performed the services gratuitously as in Giannini.
Under the application of Giannini to Joy, it would seem that Joy Manufacturing Company could "have its cake and eat it too," reporting no income
33. The court of appeals in Joy did not deal with the issue of assignment of income.
34. Lyon &Eustice, supra note 31, at 388, 389.
35. 129 F.2d 638 (9th Cir. 1942). But see Hedrick v. Commissioner, 154 F.2d 90 (2d
Cir. 1946), which held that a refusal to accept payment after the services have been
rendered will not protect the taxpayer.
36. Commissioner v. Giannini, 129 F.2d 638, 641 (9th Cir. 1942).
37. Rev. Rul. 56-472, 1956-2 CuM. BULL. 21.
38. See text accompanying notes 14-21.
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from the services it rendered to its foreign subsidiary, while the subsidiary
nevertheless takes a deduction on its British tax return for those same services.
However, the Commissioner has an alternative that he might successfully
utilize to prevent Joy Manufacturing Company from achieving this result.
Under section 482,39 when two or more business organizations are owned or
controlled by the same interests, the Service is invested with the power to
allocate or apportion income to one or more of these businesses to prevent
the evasion of taxes or to reflect income clearly. This section expressly includes
all business organizations regardless of whether they are organized in the
United States or elsewhere.40 Therefore, the fact that Joy Sullivan, Ltd. is a
British corporation would not prevent the application of section 482. The
two corporations meet the common control test of the statute since the shareholders of Joy Manufacturing Company directly or indirectly control the
wholly owned subsidiary.41 Consequently, if it could have been determined
that there was no clear reflection of income with regard to the service transactions between the parent and the subsidiary, 42 the Commission could have
allocated income to Joy Manufacturing Company. Although there are few
cases in this area, the regulations provide that whenever one member of a
group of business organizations performs marketing, managerial, administrative, or technical services for the benefit of another member of the group, the
Commissioner may make appropriate allocations to reflect an "arm's length"
charge for such services. 4 3 The services rendered by Joy Manufacturing Company to its subsidiary were of a technical nature and were gratuitous under
Giannini. Consequently, it appears that section 482 would apply in the Joy
situation. The fact that the subsidiary deducted the "expenses" incurred for
these services on its tax return presented the Service with a strong case under
section 482 to allocate a corresponding amount as income to the parent
corporation. It is therefore unlikely that Joy Manufacturing Company should
escape tax liability, but rather should suffer the same fate as the taxpayers
in Fender Sales.

39.

INT.

REV.

CODE

of 1954, §482. Although Joy was decided under the 1939 Code,

this provision existed in substantially the same form. See Int. Rev. Code of 1939, §45.
40. See Treas. Reg. §1.482-1 (a) (1) (1968). See also Hall v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 82
(5th Cir. 1961); Asiatic Petroleum Co., Ltd. v. Commissioner, 79 F.2d 234 (2d Cir. 1935),
cert. denied, 296 U.S. 645 (1935); Surrey, Treasury's Need To Curb Tax Avoidance in
Foreign Business Through Use of 482, 28 J. TAXATION 75 (1968).
41. Treas. Reg. §1A82-1 (a) (3) (1968).
42. It is assumed that no "evasion of tax" motive is present since Joy Manufacturing
Co. had a legitimate business reason for its action.
43. Treas. Reg. §1.482-2(b) (1) (1968). See also Treas. Reg. §1.482-2(b)(2) (1968),
which applies a benefit test; Treas. Reg. §1.482-2(b(3) (1968), which defines an "arm's
length" charge.
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CONCLUSION

The Joy Manufacturing Company-Fender Sales area is no longer even the
limited haven for taxpayers that it was once thought to be. The fears of the
court in Fender Sales that a loophole might exist are without basis. 44 There
is very little opportunity even for the fertile imagination of the contemporary
taxpayer to convert this previously earned income for services rendered into
capital gains via stock distribution. The Service has a much better case than
the one it presents in Revenue Ruling 67-402 (which indeed is no case at all).
In addition to the assignment of income concept and section 482, the Commissioner might well raise the tax benefit argument with respect to the
corporation rather than the shareholders. 4 1 In short, the Commissioner appears to be well prepared for the taxpayer who would be so bold as to seek
to capitalize on the conflict in the Joy and Fender Sales decisions.
CHARLES

H.

EGERTON

44. The dissent refers to the majority's fear that a loophole might exist.
45. See Commissioner v. First State Bank, 168 F.2d 1004, 1011 (5th Cir. 1948)
curring opinion) for a good discussion of the tax benefit theory.
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